Use Cases: when to use scdaemon-se (and when not to)
scdaemon-se stores your OpenPGP private keys inside the Apple Secure Enclave. Every decision about whether it fits your workflow flows from one hardware fact:
Secure Enclave keys are P-256 only, non-extractable, and bound to a single physical machine. The private key can never leave the chip, cannot be backed up, and dies with the device.
That property is simultaneously the whole value proposition and the whole risk. Use it where key loss is a recoverable inconvenience; avoid it where key loss is a catastrophe.
The defining trade-off
| Property | Benefit | Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Non-extractable key | Malware, a stolen disk, or a compromised CI token cannot exfiltrate the private key | No backup, no export, no recovery — a dead device means a lost key |
| Single-device binding | The key physically exists in one place you control | No sync, no multi-machine, no cross-platform use |
userPresence required | Touch ID / passcode on every operation — stops a remote attacker cold | Doesn’t stop local malware from riding an in-progress prompt — see Security Model |
| P-256 only | Modern, fast elliptic-curve crypto | No RSA, no ed25519; can’t import an existing key |
Good fits
The common thread: signing and authentication, where keys are rotatable and loss is recoverable.
Signing git commits and tags on your daily-driver Mac. The strongest use case. Commit signatures are inherently per-machine and non-catastrophic to rotate. If the key is lost, generate a new one and update your identity — no ciphertext becomes unrecoverable.
SSH authentication. SSH auth keys are meant to be per-device and freely rotated — exactly the right fit for a hardware-bound, presence-gated key. Losing it is a non-event: add a new public key to authorized_keys.
Signing releases or artifacts from a fixed build machine. As long as the signing identity can be rotated and you publish new public keys, non-extractability is a feature: the key physically cannot be exfiltrated by malware or a compromised token.
A high-assurance signing-only identity. For anyone who wants “my private key has never touched disk and never will” — a property a software keyring fundamentally can’t offer.
Bad fits
Encryption / decryption of anything you must not lose. The sharpest “don’t.” If your Mac is lost, stolen, or its logic board dies, every message ever encrypted to the decryption key is permanently unrecoverable. This is a data-loss trap for long-lived encrypted email, backups, or password stores — the decryption slot exists for protocol completeness, and is disabled by default for exactly this reason (see Security Model).
Your primary / certification GPG identity. A long-term master key is your identity across machines and years; binding it to one non-backupable chip means a dead device orphans your whole web of trust. If you use scdaemon-se at all, it should hold subkeys under a master kept safely offline — see Guides → Subkeys under an external master.
Cross-platform or multi-machine workflows. No Linux, no Windows, no VMs, no CI runners, no key sync (iCloud Keychain sync is explicitly disabled).
Interoperating with systems that require RSA or ed25519. P-256 only — you can’t satisfy an RSA/ed25519 requirement, and you can’t import an existing key to preserve an established fingerprint.
Unattended / headless automation. userPresence forces a Touch ID or passcode prompt on every private-key operation — a security win interactively, but it makes fully unattended batch signing (a CI server, a cron job, a remote box) impractical by design.
Regulatory / FIPS-certified requirements. The Secure Enclave is strong hardware, but it isn’t a FIPS 140-2/3 validated HSM with the accompanying audit paperwork some environments mandate.
Recommended pattern: offline master + Secure Enclave subkeys
- Generate your OpenPGP master (certification) key offline, on a well-protected machine, and back it up. This is your long-term identity and root of trust.
- Use
scdaemon-sefor the working signing and authentication subkeys you touch daily. If the Mac is lost, revoke and reissue them from the offline master. - Think hard before relying on the encryption subkey for anything durable — if you must decrypt long-lived data, make sure it’s also encrypted to a separately backed-up recovery key.
Full walkthrough: Guides → Subkeys under an external master.
Summary
| Scenario | Verdict |
|---|---|
| Git commit / tag signing on one Mac | Good fit |
| SSH authentication | Good fit |
| Release / artifact signing from a fixed machine | Good fit |
| Signing-only high-assurance identity | Good fit |
| Working subkeys under an offline master | Recommended pattern |
| Decrypting durable / long-lived ciphertext | Data-loss risk |
| Primary / master OpenPGP identity | Avoid |
| Cross-platform or multi-machine identity | Not possible |
| RSA / ed25519 interoperability | Not possible |
| Unattended / headless automation | Impractical by design |
| FIPS-certified token requirement | Not certified |