Guide: Multiple signing keys
You can back several signing keys with the Secure Enclave — for example, a personal git-signing key and a separate release-signing key, or one key per identity. Each lives on its own virtual card (a distinct serial) and is bound as its own signing subkey. gpg picks the right one automatically at signing time by keygrip, so no manual card switching is needed once they’re bound. See Architecture § Multi-card model for how this is implemented.
1. Create an additional card
scdaemon-se --add-signing-card --name "release-signing"
This prints the new card’s serial (Touch ID is required to create the key):
Added Secure Enclave signing card:
serial: D3FB65E9498AA2E3
AID: D276000124010304D3FB65E9498AA2E30000
label: release-signing
List all cards at any time:
scdaemon-se --list-cards
2. Select the card, then bind its key
gpg presents one active card at a time. Select the new card, then bind its signing key exactly as in Subkeys under an external master Step 3 (it appears as slot 1):
gpg-connect-agent 'SCD SERIALNO --demand=D3FB65E9498AA2E3' /bye
gpg --expert --edit-key $MASTER # addkey -> Existing key from card -> slot 1 -> Sign -> save
You can bind additional cards under the same master (several signing subkeys on one identity) or under different masters — whatever fits your identity layout. The primary card’s signing key is bound the normal way, with no --demand needed.
3. Sign — routing is automatic
Once bound, signing with any of them just works; gpg-agent routes each request to the owning card by keygrip:
gpg --clearsign --local-user <subkey-fpr-A> < msg # -> Good signature (card A)
gpg --clearsign --local-user <subkey-fpr-B> < msg # -> Good signature (card B)
4. Remove a card
scdaemon-se --remove-card D3FB65E9498AA2E3 --yes
Deleting a card destroys its Secure Enclave key (irreversible) and breaks any subkey bound to it. The primary card is protected and cannot be removed this way. The same non-backupable caveat applies per card — that’s fine for signing subkeys (revoke and reissue from the master), which is exactly why this is a signing-key feature and not offered for the decryption/master identity cases (see Use Cases).